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The  European  Parliament 
Following the democratic traditions of Western Europe,  the  Commission  of the European 
Communities  is  subject  to  control  by  the  representatives  of the  people.  The  body  which 
exercises  this control is  the  European Parliament.  The  latter  is  not yet a  Parliament  in  the 
sense  in  which  this  word is  generally  understood.  Its  legislative  role  is  barely  existent;  its 
I42  members  are  chosen  by  and  from  the  members  of  the  national  parliaments  of  the 
six Community  countries.  The  European  Parliament can,  however,  dismiss  the  Commission 
on a vote of censure.  It follows  its work closely  in  its 12  standing committees,  and it must 
be  consulted on  major policy  questions.  The  members,  who are  divided  into  four  cohesive 
political  groups,  ask  questions  to  which  the  Commission  must  reply.  In  accordance  with 
the  Community  Treaties,  the  European  Parliament  has  already  drawn  up  proposals  for  its 
election  by  direct  universal  suffrage,  but  no  action  to  implement  these  proposals  has  been 
taken  by  the  Community  Council  of Ministers.  Subsequently,  more  limited  proposals  put 
forward  by  the  Commission  to  increase  the  Parliament's  powers  were  frustrated.  Giving 
the  Parliament an  effective legislative  role  must now await  the  emergence  of a  new  political 
impetus  in  Europe. 
Origins 
The present European Parliament is  the successor to the 
Common Assembly  of the  European Coal and Steel  Com-
munity.  The  ECSC,  established  in  1952,  represented  a 
new  type  of international  organisation  in which  six  states 
-France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  Benelux  countries-
surrendered  certain  of  their  sovereign  powers  to  a  supra-
national  body,  the  High  Authority.  During  the  course  of 
the negotiations  to establish  the  ECSC  it was  decided  that 
the  High  Authority  should  be  supervised  by  two  further 
bodies:  the Council of Ministers,  and the Assembly.  The 
Council was to  be composed of government representatives. 
The  Assembly-which  came  to  be  called  the  Common 
Assembly-was to be composed of 78  representatives  from 
the  parliaments  of the  six  states.  The chief  powers  given 
to  the  Assembly  were  the  right  to  question  the  High 
Authority,  the  right  to  discuss  its  annual  report,  and-a 
completely  new  departure  in  an international  organisation 
-the power to force its resignation if necessary by a motion 
of censure.  In practice,  in  the  course  of development  of 
the  ECSC,  power  tended  to  shift  away  from  the  High 
Authority  towards  the  Council  of  Ministers.  As  a  result 
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the  Assembly  often  found  itself  supporting  the  High 
Authority  vis-a-vis  the  Council. 
When,  in 1957,  it was  decided  to establish the EEC and 
Euratom alongside the ECSC, a new parliamentary assembly 
was  created  to  serve  all  three  Communities.  The  Rome 
Treaties  refer  to  this  body  simply  as  the  Assembly,  but 
in  1962  it  adopted  the  title  of  the  European  Parliament. 
The Parliament  benefited  greatly  from  the  previous  expe-
rience  of  the  Common  Assembly.  It was  granted  super-
visory  powers  very  similar  to  those  of  the  latter,  but  in 
addition  was  given  considerable  consultative  rights,  which 
will  be described later on. 
Structure 
The  European  Parliament  holds  its  plenary  sessions  in 
the chamber of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, while 
its  Secretariat is  located in  Luxembourg.  It usually meets 
between  six  and  eight  times  a  year,  each  meeting  lasting 
about five  days.  In addition, the Parliament has an annual 
two-day  joint  session  with  the  Consultative  Assembly  of 
the  Council  of Europe, at which it presents a  report of its 
activities  and  an  exchange  of  views  takes  place.  Repre-sentatives from the Parliament also meet from time to time 
with parliamentarians from the African countries associated 
with the European Communities. 
Composition 
The  Parliament  is  larger  than  the  former  Common 
Assembly,  being  composed  of  142  members  nominated  by 
the  parliaments  of  the  six  member  states.  This  larger 
number is  intended to enable all shades of political opinion 
in  each  country  to  be  represented.  The  distribution  of 
members  is  as  follows: 
France  36 
Germany  36 
Italy  36 
Belgium  14 
Netherlands  14 
Luxembourg  6 
The  method  of  nominating  members  is  left  to  the 
individual  countries  and  varies  considerably  in  practice. 
The Dutch and Belgian members are nominated from both 
houses  of  parliament in  such  a  way  that political  parties 
are  represented  in proportion to their  strength.  The  Ger-
man  members  are also nominated  on  a  proportional basis, 
but  from  the  Bundestag  alone.  The  French  and  Italian 
members,  on  the  other  hand,  are  chosen  by  a  majority 
vote in both houses.  Finally the Luxembourg members are 
nominated by the parliamentary committee for foreign  and 
military  affairs. 
An important result of these  different  methods  of nomi-
nation is that the French and Italian Communist parties are 
not  represented  in  the  European  Parliament.  In  other 
words, in France and Italy the centre and right-wing parties, 
who  form  the  majority,  never  vote  for  a  Communist 
representative  to  the Parliament.  Recently,  as  a  result  of 
the "opening to the left" of the Italian government, a deter-
mined effort was  made  to secure  the  representation  of the 
Italian Communists.  But difficulties  arose  which  have  not 
yet been resolved.  Consequently at the  beginning  of 1969 
the Italian delegation  to the European Parliament was  still 
that designed before the 1963  general elections,  despite  the 
fact that many of its members have since lost their seats in 
the Italian national parliament.  It is  thought however that 
the  new  Centre-left  government  of Signor  Rumor  which 
came into being in December 1968,  will  tackle the problem 
in the near future. 
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Direct elections 
Although  the  Parliament  is  at present  indirectly  elected 
the  Treaties  provide  for  the  eventual  holding  of  direct 
elections.  The EEC Treaty states that "The Assembly shall 
I  At  the  time  of  going  to  press  (21.1.69)  the  Italian  Parliament 
has  nominated  a  new  delegation  including  Communists  for  the  first 
time.  This  delegation  is  made up  as  follows:  Christian  Democrats  16; 
Communists  7;  Socialists:  PSI  6,  PSIUP  1;  Liberals  2;  Independent 
Left  1;  Monarchist  1;  Republican  1;  Italian  S~c~al  Movement  ~n.eo­
Fascist)  1.  This  will  also  change  the  composition  of  the  political 
groups  (see  p.  3). 
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draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage 
in  accordance  with  a  uniform  procedure  in  all  Member 
States.  The Council  shall unanimously decide  on the  pro-
visions  which  it  shall  recommend  to  Member  States  for 
adoption  in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitutional 
requirements."  The European Parliament drew up a  draft 
Convention  on  direct  elections  in  May  1960  which  it 
presented  to  the  Council  of  Ministers.  This  Convention 
proposed a  two-stage move to a directly elected Parliament, 
but fully  defined  only  the first  of these  stages.  During its 
first  period, which was  to last from  the entry into force  of 
the  Convention  until  at least  the  completion  of  the  third 
stage  of the  Common  Market,  the  Parliament  was  to  be 
enlarged  to 425  members,  of whom  two  thirds  would  be 
directly  elected.  The  remaining  third  would  continue  to 
be  nominated  by  the  national  parliaments. 
The Convention did not provide for a uniform system of 
election for those members  directly elected  during  the  first 
stage.  They  were  to  be  elected  either  according  to  the 
existing  national  electoral  procedures  for  each  state,  or 
according  to the new  procedures  laid  down  by  each state. 
A detailed and uniform electoral system for all its members 
was  to  be  worked  out by  the  Parliament during  the  first 
stage and implemented in the second. 
Despite  repeated  requests  by  the  Parliament,  the  Con-
vention  has  not  yet  been  approved  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  There  are,  of course,  many  technical  problems 
connected  with  direct  elections.  The  electoral  systems  of 
the six countries differ considerably, and it might be difficult 
to agree on a uniform system. 
But clearly  the  main problem lies  not in  the  mechanics 
but in  the  "politics"  of such  a  move.  A  directly  elected 
Parliament, given that the elections were properly conducted 
and  the  people  of Europe  participated  in  them,  would  be 
legitimately  entitled  to  demand  a  much  larger  share  in 
the  making  of European  policies  than  the  present  Parlia-
ment, indeed it could  claim  to  be  the  supreme  power,  the 
only one based directly on the people.  Few of the govern-
ments  would  be  prepared  to  sanction  such  a  radical 
development  and  this  explains  the  Convention's  lack  of 
success. 
Internal organisation 
Turning now  to internal  organisation,  the  Parliament is 
directed  by a  Bureau,  consisting  of a  President  and eight 
Vice-Presidents  elected  by  the  members.  The  Parliament 
has also created, to facilitate its work, a number of standing 
committees  each  specialising  in  a  particular aspect  of the 
Communities'  activities.  Today  there  are  twelve  such 
committees, of which the biggest (29  members each) are the 
political  committee,  the  economic  committee,  the  agri-
cultural committee,  the committee for social  problems,  the 
committee  for  external  relations,  and  the  committee  for 
energy,  research  and  atomic  problems.  The  committees 
meet  frequently  both  during  the  plenary  sessions  of  the 
Parliament  and  between  them-in  fact  there  are  usually 
over  200  committee  meetings  each  year.  Many  of  these 
meetings  are  held  in  Brussels,  and  members  of  the  Com-
mission are invited to attend them and explain their policies before  them.  As  the  meetings  are  held  in  camera  full 
and frank exchanges  of views  can take place.  Apart from 
this  the  committees  prepare  the  reports  which  form  the 
basis  of  the  Parliament's  debates;  in  contrast  to  British 
practice, debates are not normally held  before a  committee 
has  discussed  the  issue  in  question. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  aspects  of  the  European 
Parliament is the degree to which party groups have formed 
which cut across national boundaries.  These groups began 
to coalesce from the very earliest days of the old Common 
Assembly,  and today  they  dominate  much  of the  working 
of  the  Parliament.  To  take  the  most  obvious  example, 
the  members  of the  Parliament sit according to party affil-
iation  rather  than  according  to  nationality.  Nearly every 
election  or nomination for  offices  within  the  Parliament is 
decided  by  the  party  groups  rather  than  by  the  national 
delegations.  Similarly,  many  of the  debates  of the Parlia-
ment have  a  strong partisan  flavour,  and party spokesmen 
take  precedence  in  the  order  of  speaking.  Considerable 
allegiance  to the  party groups is  also  shown  in the voting 
patterns  of the  Parliament. 
There  are  four  party  groups  in  the  Parliament  In 
September  1968  their  strength  was  as  follows: 
Christian Democrat Group  60 
Socialist Group  3  3 
Liberals and Associates  25 
European Democratic Union  16 
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The  Christian  Democrats  have  always  been  the  largest 
group in the Parliament.  They are well  organised, and are 
linked through their Secretariat with  the  national Christian 
Democrat parties  of the  Community.  They  publish  their 
own  periodical,  and  set  up  working  parties  to  study  par-
ticular European problems. 
The Socialists are even  more cohesive  than the  Christian 
Democrats, and are linked to the national parties not only 
through  a  liaison  office  in  Luxembourg  but also  through 
regular conferences.  They publish a journal, set up working 
parties, and have adopted forceful policies not only on food 
prices  and  cartel  policy,  but  also  on  the  democratisation 
of the Communities. 
The  Liberals,  drawn  from  a  broad  spectrum  of parties, 
are the least cohesive of the party groups, but have provided 
some very effective speakers. 
Finally  the  European  Democratic  Union,  established  in 
1965,  is  composed  entirely  of  French  Gaullists.  It fre-
quently  provides  the  role  of  an  "opposition"  within  the 
European Parliament. 
It should be  added  that the  party groups  are  subsidised 
from the Parliament's budget.  A fixed  sum is  paid to each 
group, and a  variable amount added in proportion to their 
respective  strength. 
The Parliament's Secretariat in Luxembourg has at present 
a  permanent  staff  of about  560,  to whom  a  considerable 
number  of  temporary  staff  are  added  during  plenary  ses-
sions.  It  is responsible solely to the Parliament, and services 
all its  activities. 
1  Total:  134.  There are 8  vacant  seats,  resulting  from  the death of 
members. 
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Functions and  powers 
The  EEC  Treaty  classifies  the  European  Parliament's 
powers as "advisory and supervisory."  The most important 
of  the  advisory  powers  is  undoubtedly  the  Parliament's 
right  to  be  consulted  over  major  policy  proposals  in  the 
EEC  and  Euratom.  This  right  provides  the  Parliament 
with  the  substance  of most  of its  debates  and  committee 
work-though the  substance  is  often highly  technical. 
According  to  the  Treaties,  consultation  is  made  by  the 
Council  after  it  has  received  a  given  proposal  from  the 
Commission.  In practice  the  Commission  has  sometimes 
consulted  the  Parliament  while  it  is  in  the  process  of 
drafting  its  proposals.  Only  when  it  has  been  decided, 
within the framework  of a  given  policy,  to delegate  imple-
menting powers to the Commission is  Parliament no longer 
asked for its  opinion. 
The  right  of  consultation  is  not  a  power  of  decision. 
The Council is  not bound in any way by the opinion which 
the Parliament gives,  and the Commission too may change 
its  original  proposals  as  it thinks  fit,  after  the  Parliament 
has been consulted.  The most the EEC Treaty says is that 
"the  regulations,  directives  and  decisions  of  the  Council 
and  of the  Commission  shall  be  fully  reasoned  and  shall 
refer  to  any  proposals  or  opinions"  which  the  Treaty 
requires  to be  obtained. 
In  practice  the  influence  of  the  Parliament's  views  on 
measures  adopted  by  the  Council  has  varied  considerably 
from  case  to case.  For  example  when  the  EEC's  policy 
towards cartels, mergers, and monopolies was being drafted 
the  Parliament's  opinion  carried  considerable  weight.  On 
this occasion the Parliament was fortunate in having as one 
of its members, Mr. Deringer, an international expert in the 
field  of restrictive  practices.  The report drafted  under his 
name  made  a  number  of very  precise  amendments  to the 
policy drawn up  by  the Commission,  and several  of these 
amendments  were  incorporated  in  the  final  text.  In  the 
field  of social policy too the Parliament's views  have  often 
been incorporated in Community policy.  Over agricultural 
policy  the  position  is  not  such  a  happy  one.  Here  the 
very  protracted  negotiations  between  the  Commission  and 
the Council  tend  to  develop  a  logic  of their  own  and the 
Parliament's views  sometimes fall  by the wayside. 
The  Parliament  can,  without  waiting  for  official  con-
sultation,  make  proposals,  and  take initiatives  of its  own. 
It did  this  notably in 1961  when  it convened a  conference 
with  the  parliamentarians  of the  associated  overseas  terri-
tories.  The Parliament has  also  done  pioneer work in the 
field  of  transport  policy,  thanks  to  two  comprehensive 
reports  by a  Dutch member,  Mr.  Kapteyn.  Again,  during 
the  negotiations  for  British  membership,  the  report  pro-
duced  by Mr.  Birkelbach,  defining  the  principles  on which 
the  Community's  policy  towards  membership  and associa-
tion should be based,  had a  very  considerable impact. 
The  Parliament  has  constantly  taken  the  initiative  in 
pressing  for  the  strengthening  and  consolidation  of  the 
Communities.  For  example  it  has  carried  on  a  long 
campaign  for  the  merger  of  the  three  Communities,  and 
can claim  at least  some  of the  credit  for  the  decision  to 
merge  the  executives in  1967. Of  the  supervisory  powers  of  the  Parliament  the  most 
extreme  is  the  right  to  censure  the  Commission  and  to 
force  its  resignation  as  a  body.  To be  effective a  censure 
motion  has  to  be carried  by  a  two-thirds  majority  of the 
votes  cast,  representing  a  majority  of the  members  of  the 
Parliament.  Its  chief weakness  is  that the  Parliament has 
no right to nominate  the  successors  of the censured  body, 
and has  therefore no guarantee  that the new  body will  be 
more favourable  to its views  than the old.  The motion  of 
censure  has  never  in  fact  been  used,  though  it has  been 
threatened on occasion. 
Of more practical use  for  the  day-to-day  supervision  of 
the  executive  is  the  Parliament's  right  to  ask  questions. 
These  can be  of three  types:  written,  oral,  and oral  with 
debate.  In theory  these  questions  can be  put to both the 
Commission and the Council;  in practice the great majority 
are  put  to the  Commission.  The  written  question  is  the 
form  most  frequently  used,  though  there  has  been  a 
significant  increase  in the  number  of  oral  questions  with 
debate  in  recent  years.  Questions  can  be  highly  useful 
in exposing and publicising the lesser-known aspects  of the 
Commission's  activities.  An  energetic  Dutch  member  of 
the  Parliament,  Mr.  Vredeling,  has  asked  a  vast  number 
of questions which have succeeded in illuminating the more 
obscure  comers  of  the  Community's  agricultural  policy. 
A  lively  debate  about  the  effects  of  the  nuclear  non-
proliferation Treaty on the Community was  sparked off  by 
an  oral  question  to  the  Commission  in  March  1967. 
Recently  an oral question  by Mr.  Dehousse,  a  prominent 
Belgian  member,  has  brought  the  subject  of  a  European 
University  into  the  open  once  more. 
Valuable  questions  are  also  put  to  members  of  the 
Commission who attend meetings of the Parliament's stand-
ing  committees.  Most  members  of  the  Parliament  have 
considerable experience of committee work in their national 
parliaments  and  can  use  this  experience  to  cross-examine 
and discuss  matters with the  members  of the  Commission. 
The latter usually make  an effort  to be  on good  relations 
with the committee dealing with the subject for which they 
are responsible. 
Finally  the  debate  on  the  annual  report  of  the  Com-
mission  provides  the Parliament with  a  useful  occasion  to 
make  an  overall  assessment  of  the  Commission's  work. 
On these  occasions  the Parliament makes  a  systematic  and 
detailed  examination  of each  aspect  of  the  Commission's 
work,  and  calls  attention  to  any  weaknesses  or errors  of 
policy. 
It is  clear that the Parliament's supervisory powers relate 
chiefly  to the  Commission,  not the  Council.  In the  early 
years  only the  annual debates,  or .. colloques",  between all 
three  institutions  allowed  the  Parliament  to  enter  into  a 
dialogue with the Council.  In recent years the Council has 
usually presented a  half-yearly report to  the Parliament as 
well. 
In the  budgetary field  the  powers  of the Parliament are 
limited.  It can draft its  own  estimates,  and is  empowered 
to  discuss,  and  propose  amendments  to  the  Community's 
budget  as  a  whole.  The final  power  of decision  in  both 
instances rests with the Council. 
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Conclusion 
Of  the  many  international  assemblies  now  in  existence, 
the European Parliament is  the nearest to a real Parliament. 
It  performs  important  supervisory  functions  over  an 
executive  with  power,  and it discusses  proposals  which  in 
many  cases  become  laws  affecting  directly  the  life  of 
citizens  within  the  Common Market.  It serves  as  a  public 
forum  in  which  many  of  the  complex  subjects,  discussed 
behind  closed  doors  in  Brussels,  can  be  openly  debated. 
It takes  the  initiative  in  pressing  for  action  over  a  wide 
range of subjects.  However, it would be wrong to overlook 
the restrictions on the Parliament's powers. It is  not directly 
elected, it does not have the last word on the "laws" passed 
within  the  Community,  and  it  exercises  little  supervisory 
power over the  Council  of Ministers. 
There are clearly two directions in which the Parliament's 
status  can  be  improved.  The  first  is  through  the  intro-
duction  of  direct  elections,  and  the  second  through  an 
increase  in its  powers.  There  are  some  who  feel  that an 
increase in powers  must take  place  before direct elections, 
because  otherwise the European electorate might take little 
interest in such elections.  Others argue that direct elections 
must  remain  the  primary  aim:  they  would  like  to  see  a 
"constituent assembly" draft a  constitution for Europe. 
In 1965  the EEC Commission made an effort to increase 
the  Parliament's  budgetary  powers.  It proposed  that  the 
common  agricultural  policy  should  be  financed  by  direct 
Community  revenues,  and  that  the  Parliament  should  be 
given  an  effective  voice  in  approving  the  agricultural 
budget.  These  proposals  sparked  off  the  "constitutional 
crisis"  of 1965-France strongly  objecting  to any increase 
in either the Commission's  or the  Parliament's  powers.  It 
was  finally  decided,  in  1966,  to  postpone  the  creation  of 
direct  revenues  and  to  hold  over  the  issue  of  the  Parlia-
ment's  budgetary  powers  until  the  end  of the  transitional 
period. 
As  this  episode  makes  clear,  the  future  development  of 
the European Parliament depends essentially on whether, in 
the  next few  years,  there  is  a  renewal  of the  political will 
to integrate  Europe. 
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Sea  ports of  The  North 
the  European  Community and  Britain 
The  waters  of the North Sea,  once  peripheral  to  the  main  trading  area  of the  Mediter-
ranean,  are  now  the  most  intensively  used  by  the  shipping  fleets  of  the  world.  Around 
its  shores  have  grown  some  of  the  world's  greatest  ports,  each  with  a  long  history  of 
mercantile  activity.  As political  and  economic  power shifted  from  Southern  into  Northern 
Europe the  ports along the  Mediterranean seaboard, such as  Venice  and Marseilles,  lost their 
role  as  major points of exchange.  The  colonial  enterprises  of Britain,  the  Netherlands  and 
other Northern countries brought an  increasing trade  to their ports as  tropical produce  began, 
for  the  first  time,  to  be  carried  in  large  quantities  over  long  distances.  The  dominance  of 
these  Northern  ports  was  reinforced  as  manufacturing  industries  grew  up  on  the  coalfields 
of Britain,  Belgium,  France  and  Germany.  As  the  economies  of  these  countries  became 
increasingly  dependent  on  the  exchange  of coal  and  manufactures  for  foodstuffs  and  raw 
materials  so  the  docks  of  London,  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  expanded.  In  contrast  the 
Mediterranean  ports,  lacking  important industrial areas  within  their  hinterlands,  without  the 
advantage of large  colonial markets or because  their location  was  off the  main  ocean  routes, 
lagged  further  behind. 
Today the Northern ports seem firmly  entrenched as  the 
major trading centres  for Western  Europe.  The economic 
heart  of  the  continent  stretches  from  N orthem  France 
across  the  Benelux  countries  into  the  Federal  Republic. 
This compact area borders  the  North Sea on  one  side  and 
the  central  areas  are  crossed  by  the  Rhine  on  its  way  to 
Rotterdam.  Excellent road and rail systems and a  network 
of navigable waterways extend beyond state boundaries and 
have allowed the  growth  of great international ports.  Yet 
this  pattern,  which  appears  to  be  one  based  on  the 
advantage  of  location  and  to  possess  a  certain  stability, 
remains subject to the  influence  of many factors. 
Commercial  rivalries,  such  as  that  between  the  Belgians 
and  the  Dutch,  have  accentuated  the  natural  competition 
which  exists  between  ports.  The  foresight  and  energy  of 
port authorities  has  also  been  a  significant  factor  in  their 
development,  especially  at a  time  when  the  technology  of 
handling  and  moving  cargoes  is  rapidly  changing.  The 
increasing size  of modem bulk carriers has  emphasized the 
advantages  of deepwater  channels  and  has  caused  all  the 
major ports to undertake engineering projects  to secure the 
necessary depths.  The result has been a seaward expansion 
of estuarine ports such as London, Antwerp and, especially, 
Rotterdam.  Large  specialized  freighters  require  a  quick 
tum-round in  harbour, which  fact explains  the  importance 
of  modem  handling  equipment  and  efficient  dock  labour. 
The  expanding  trade  between  the  EFT  A  and  EEC 
countries has been facilitated by improvements in the tran-
shipment of general cargo.  The roll-on/roll-off technique is 
particularly suitable for short passages such as  those across 
the  North Sea  and these  freight  services  have  been  estab-
lished at many ports.  A second stage in the revolution has 
been the use of container ships.  This development concerns 
not  only  the  short  sea-hauls  but  also  the  longer  oceanic 
routes.  The  very  specialized  nature  of  container  berths, 
with expensive  handling gear and adjacent assembly  areas, 
implies  the  concentration  of  such  facilities  at  a  limited 
number of large ports.  Thus each major North Sea port is 
eager  to  establish  itself  as  a  terminal  for  those  shipping 
lines operating ocean-container services. 
An important consequence  of the  increasing  size  of ore-
carriers and oil-tankers has  been  the  reduction in transport 
costs  in certain bulk commodities.  This has led in turn to 
the increasing attraction of port-areas for industries.  Large 
oil refineries  are a long-established feature at ports such as 
London  and  Rotterdam  and  new  iron  and  steel  plants  are 
exploiting the advantage of low assembly costs at tidewater 
locations.  Oil,  coal  and  metallic  ores  comprise  a  large 
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proportion  of  the  total  tonnages  handled  at  the  main 
North Sea  ports  and  often  the  greater  part of these  com-
modities is  destined for use within the vicinity of the docks. 
Changing techniques have led to a reduction in transport 
costs in many classes of cargoes which encourages a growth 
of  trade  generally.  A  further  stimulus  to  port  activity 
around  the  North  Sea  has  been  the  rapidly  growing 
exchanges  between  the  members  of  the  European  Com-
munity  and  other  West  European  nations,  particularly 
Britain.  Each  of  the  ports  concerned  in  this  trade  is 
seeking  to  assure  itself  of a  share  in  this  increase.  The 
changing frontiers of the hinterlands reflect not only changes 
in land  transport but also  the  evolving  economic  structure 
of  the  Common  Market.  "A  Europe  without  frontiers" 
affords  great  opportunities  for  ports  like  Antwerp  and 
Rotterdam  to  enlarge  the  range  of  their  international 
services.  The competition is  intense, as it is  too on a lesser 
scale  between  the  ports  on  Britain's East coast. 
Table  1 
North Sea  ports' goods  traffic,  1967 
(millions  of tons) a 
Rotterdam 
London 
Antwerp 
Hamburg 
Medway 
Wilhelmshaven 
Bremen 
Dunkirk 
Amsterdam 
Emden 
Tees 
Immingham  and  Grimsby 
Hull 
141.4 
60.1 
60.0 
35.4 
25.9 
19.9 
17.4 
17.0 
14.3 
10.4 
9.9 
9.6 
9.2 
Source:  Statistical Review,  Rotterdam Port Authority, June  1968. 
a  The statistics given for volumes of trade refer to metric tons in the 
case  of  continental  ports  and  to  long  tons  for  British  ones  (1  metric 
ton =  0.984 long ton). 
The scene  is  dominated  by  a  few  great  ports  endowed 
with certain geographical advantages.  Thus the delta ports 
of  Rotterdam,  Antwerp  and  Amsterdam  together  handled 
I/ almost 200 million tons of cargo in 1965-that is  one-sixth 
of all the goods  transported across  the seas.  Will  the  pre-
eminence  of  such  ports  be  maintained?  Two  important 
factors  are  involved  in  this  issue.  First the  size  of bulk 
carriers may in the future restrict them to a very few  deep-
water  ports  and  even  exclude  them  from  the  North  Sea 
channels.  (This  could  create  new  opportunities  for  har-
bours  along  the  Mediterranean  and  Atlantic  coasts,  and 
especially  the  latter,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  development 
at Bantry Bay.)  Secondly, the reorganization and improve-
ment of transport systems within the Community may affect 
the positions of advantage enjoyed by the major ports. 
The Rhine  Delta ports 
These  ports  serve  the  main  heavy  industrial  regions  of 
the  Common  Market,  importing  fuels,  ores  and  other raw 
materials and exporting finished  manufactures.  Good road, 
rail and waterway systems are the foundation of this transit 
traffic  and,  via  the  Rhine,  their hinterlands  extend  beyond 
the frontiers  of the EEC. 
Rotterdam 
Since  1962,  when  it  overtook New York,  Rotterdam has 
been the world's biggest port.  It is  located on the dredged 
and lockfree channel of the New Meuse and its connections 
to  the  Rhine  and  Meuse  make  it  a  focal  point  for  the 
water-borne  traffic  of  North West  Europe.  Thus  Rotter-
dam, in addition to being the main port of the Netherlands, 
has  become  the  major  port  for  trade  between  Germany 
and countries outside the Common Market and also handles 
much of the  trade of Switzerland and Eastern France. 
The  rate  of  growth  in  traffic  through  Rotterdam  has 
remained steady at around 7 to 10  % in recent years. 
Table 2  Growth of Rotterdam's trade 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1967 
Goods (millions  of tons} 
83.3 
90.1 
96.6 
103.3 
113.3 
122.8 
141.4 
Rotterdam's  contemporary  pre-eminence  is  a  result  not 
only  of a  favourable  location,  however.  Post-war  recon-
struction  and expansion  modernized  and  greatly  added  to 
the system  of docks which stretches along  the New Meuse 
and  within  this  system  there  is  specialization  within  the 
basins-Waalhaven  for  bulk  commodities  and  Eemhaven 
for  containerized  freight.  At  Botlek,  begun  in  1947,  a 
new  port for  bulk  cargoes  was  created  with  three  basins 
for tankers up to 90,000 tons.  Here a huge petro-chemical 
complex has grown up and an oil pipeline leads to Cologne 
and  Frankfurt. 
In  1958  work  started  on  the  new  harbour  basin  of 
Europoort at the  seaward  end  of the  waterway,  designed 
to handle imports of oil, coal and ores for industries nearby 
and along the  Rhine.  A further extension  of this ancillary 
port is  planned  by  means  of dykes  projecting  two  miles 
into  the  North  Sea  to  accommodate  tankers  of  at  least 
160,000  tons. Sites  for  metal  and cement industries  will  be 
available on  reclaimed  land. 
Rotterdam  is  essentially  a  transhipment  point  for  bulk 
cargoes  which  in  1965  accounted  for  85 %  of  the  total 
traffic. 
Table 3  Breakdown  of Rotterdam's  trade,  1965 
Goods handled 
Total  traffic 
Bulk  materials 
of which: 
Petroleum 
Mineral ores 
Cereals 
Coal 
Fertilizers 
Others 
Millions of tons 
122.8 
W4.0 
68.7 
15.9 
5.8 
5.4 
4.0 
4.3 
Most  of  the  oil  is  refined  at  Rotterdam  for  the  Dutch 
market or for re-export. 
Almost  two-thirds  of  the  freight,  mainly  bulk  cargoes 
such as ores destined for the  Ruhr, which passes Lobith on 
the  German  frontier  moves  through  the  New  Meuse  and 
Rotterdam is  the main port for  Rhine  traffic.  (1965:  Rot-
terdam, 45.5  m.t;  Duisburg, 32.0 m.t;  Strasbourg, 10.1  m.t.) 
This  international  transit  traffic  accounts  for  about  one-
third  of  the  goods  handled,  although  this  proportion  is 
declining. 
The  imbalance  between  imports  and  exports,  with  the 
former  representing  77 %  of  Rotterdam's  total  trade  in 
1967-imports:  109  m.t.,  exports:  32  m.t.-is characteristic 
of the major ports which serve the industrialized economies 
of Western Europe. 
Antwerp 
Antwerp  is  without  easy  or direct  access  to  the  Rhine, 
and its canal network, which extends into Northern France, 
needs modernization. Moreover, the winding Scheidt estuary 
limits  access  to vessels  under  60,000  tons  and  necessitates 
floating docks and locks.  Nor has  Antwerp the advantage 
of  a  large  national  merchant  shipping  fleet.  It  is  these 
disadvantages  which  help  to  explain  the  superior  growth 
of Rotterdam and the differences  in  the  character of their 
trade. 
Antwerp  is  essentially  a  national  port,  which  handles 
87 % of all  the  Belgian sea traffic.  It serves  an industrial-
ized  country,  importing  fuels,  metal  ores,  cereals  and 
general cargo whilst its  exports are dominated by iron and 
steel  and  other  metal  goods  and  a  wide  range  of  other 
manufactures.  Petroleum, which accounts for 36 % of the 
total  traffic,  is  imported largely  for  national  consumption. 
One-fifth of Antwerp's cargoes are in transit.  This trade, 
consisting largely  of general and dry cargoes,  concerns  the 
northern  French  coalfield,  Lorraine,  the  Saar,  Eastern 
France, Switzerland  and  the  Rhine  and Westphalian  lands 
of Germany.  Three-quarters of this traffic moves along the 
Rhine,  using  the  devious  waterways  of  the  Meuse-Rhine 
delta.  Traffic  in  1967  totalled  60  million  tons  (imports: 
40.9;  exports:  19.1). 
To  increase  its  share  in  international  transit  traffic 
Antwerp has  secured Dutch agreement for the construction 
of a canal to the Rhine.  In addition, its water connections 
with Southern Belgium and France are being improved and 
a  motorway  links  it  to  Cologne.  The  Scheidt  is  being 
deepened  for  larger  ships  and  a  new  dock  system,  with 
twenty  miles  of quays,  largely  for  bulk  cargoes,  has  been 
created.  Nearby  a  new  industrial  area,  with  oil  refining, 
chemicals  and  car-assembly  plants,  has  been  established. 
Ironically this  development  may  be  to Rotterdam's advan-
tage  since  the  exclusion  of  supertankers  from  the  lower 
Scheidt  has  led  to a  plan  to pipe  oil  from  Europoort  to 
Antwerp's  refineries.  The  alternative  is  a  pipeline  from 
a  terminal  port built  eighteen  miles  off  Zeebrugge  on  the 
Thornton Bank. TRAFFIC  OF  THE  EIGHT  PRINCIPAL  NORTH  SEA  PORTS 
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Amsterdam's pre-war function as  a national port handling 
the  commerce  of Dutch colonies  has  largely  disappeared. 
Tropical  produce,  for  processing  and  redistribution,  has 
become of minor importance, particularly since  the  loss  of 
the Dutch East Indies.  This setback has been offset in two 
ways-by attracting industries to the port and by improving 
the connections with the  Rhine. 
The  foundation  of  Amsterdam's  modern  growth  is  the 
North Sea  Canal which  has  been  deepened  to 50  feet  and 
widened  to  allow  two  ships  of  65,000  tons  to  pass.  At 
IJmuiden,  on  the  sea-ward end,  jetties  have  been  built for 
ships up to 100,000  tons. 
The modernization  of the  canal  to Tiel  in  1952  enables 
Amsterdam to share in  the  traffic  moving along the  Rhine, 
for  it reduces  the  journey  to  the  German-Dutch  frontier 
by  one  day  and  allows  pushed  convoys  of  six  barges  to 
operate from  the  port. 
These  improvements  have  led  to  a  growth  of  activity, 
largely through the increase in transit traffic moving up the 
Rhine  and  also  through  the  demands  of  the  industries 
which  flank  the  North  Sea  Canal.  Here  waterside  sites 
have been used for iron and steel,  oil, cement and fertilizer 
plants.  Through these recent developments Amsterdam has 
become a port for bulk cargoes and is trying to attract more 
large ocean carriers by its  improved facilities. 
The  goods  handled  in  1967  totalled  14.3  million  tons, 
of which  exports were  4 million  tons.  An increasing  pro-
portion of the total consists of goods in international transit, 
almost all  of which  are carried by  inland  waterways. 
The North German  ports 
The  marshy,  dune-fringed  coast  and  shallow  estuaries 
of North  Germany  provide  harbours  inferior  to  those  of 
the  Low  Countries,  but proximity  to the  Baltic,  to  Rhine-
Westphalia  and to the  water-routes  of Central Europe has 
encouraged  the  growth  of  large  ports.  Reconstruction 
after  the  wartime  devastation,  improved  road  and  rail 
communications  and  further industrialization  have  enabled 
Hamburg  and  Bremen  to  offset  some  of  the  difficulties 
imposed  by  a  location  eccentric  to  the  industrial  heart 
of the  EEC  and  by  the  political  and  economic  barrier  of 
the  Iron CUrtain.  The hinterlands  of these  ports embrace 
the industrial regions  of Lower Saxony together with  their 
own  important  manufacturing  areas  and  Hamburg  retains 
something  of its  international  character  by  its  links  with 
Central Europe. 
Hamburg 
This city,  the  largest in West Germany, is  also  the chief 
manufacturing centre and the main port.  In 1967 the docks 
handled  35.4  million  tons  of  freight  (Imports:  26.7; 
Exports:  8.7). 
Table 4  Growth of Hamburg's  trade 
(millions  of  tons) 
Year  Imports  Exports  Total 
1936  14.8  7.2  22.0 
1946  3.1  0.9  4.0 
1950  7.4  3.5  10.9 
1958  20.7  7.3  28.0 
1962  24.4  6.2  30.6 
1965  26.6  8.5  35.1 
1967  26.7  8.7  35.4 
Of the imports petroleum shows an increasing proportion 
(45  %),  whilst  the importance  of general cargoes  (35  % of 
total trade in 1967) reflects the size of the local markets and 
the industrial character of the city. 
The partition of Germany severed  a  large  part of Ham-
burg's  pre-war hinterland and,  although limited  trade  with 
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East Germany, Poland  and,  especially,  Czechoslovakia  has 
been resumed, the international transit traffic remains much 
less  than  pre-war.  In  1966  Hamburg  handled  1.5  million 
tons  for  Czechoslovakia.  Re-exports  to  Scandinavian 
countries and Great Britain amounted to a further 2 million 
tons  in  1964.  The existence  of a  freeport  area,  in  which 
foodstuffs  are processed before distribution, is  an important 
basis  for  this  transit trade. 
The establishment of new industries such as  oil refineries, 
chemical  and  machinery  manufacturing  has  led  to  an 
increase  in  bulk cargo  traffic  requiring an extension  of the 
docks  towards  the  sea  and  the  provision  of large  sites  to 
the  south  of  the  port.  Downstream  the  Elbe  has  been 
deepened  to  accommodate  60,000  ton  ships  and  at  the 
river-mouth  the  outport of CUxhaven  is  being  equipped  to 
handle  ore-carriers  and  oil-tankers  of  up  to  100,000  tons. 
New  motorways  to  the  north-east  and  south-west  and 
rail-electrification  have  improved  Hamburg's  links  with 
its  West  German hinterland.  In  1965  work  began  on  the 
Seiten Canal, parallel to the Elbe, which will join the Mittel-
land Canal at Wolfsburg and give  Hamburg a  share in the 
heavy  traffic  moving  between  the  Salzgitter and the  Ruhr. 
Bremen 
Traditionally the port for North American trade and for 
the  unloading  of cotton, coffee,  tobacco and tropical food-
stuffs,  Bremen  has  not expanded as  rapidly as  other major 
ports:  1967  total trade:  17.4  million tons;  1965:  17.5  mil-
lion tons;  1964:  15.3  million tons;  1960:  15.1  million tons. 
The character of its  trade is  now undergoing changes  with 
the  development  of its  outports.  Bremerhaven,  the  major 
passenger  port for  North Atlantic lines,  is  being  equipped 
to handle  bulk cargoes. 
From  the  modern  terminal  at  Weserport  iron  ore  is 
moved  by  rail  to the  KIOckner  works  at Bremen  or Salz-
gitter  and  the  Ruhr.  Four  shipping  lines  operate  trans-
atlantic container services  from  two  berths  at Bremen and 
one at Bremerhaven. 
Emden 
The  challenge  of Weserport  to  Rotterdam's  position  as 
Germany's  main  ore-port  is  increased  by  Emden,  which 
specializes  in  handling  Swedish  ore.  But  although Emden 
has  the  shortest all-German  water-connection  to the  Ruhr 
handicaps  are  imposed  on  its  growth  by  shallow  draught. 
Wilhelmshaven 
Since  the  construction in  1959  of a  pipeline  to Cologne 
and the  Ruhr, Wilhelmshaven has developed steadily as an 
oil-port  and  refinery,  lessening  German  dependence  on 
Rotterdam.  There are plans for  an ore-terminal here too. 
Northern France 
Dunkirk 
This  port  is  essentially  artificial,  created  from  sand-
dunes and marsh and protected by a  breakwater.  Without 
the  long  history  of  the  major  Belgian  and  Dutch  ports, 
Dunkirk's  growth  stems  largely  from  the  exploitation  and 
industrialization  of  the  North  coalfield.  Its  function  as 
the  entry-point  for  raw  materials  has  been  accentuated  in 
recent years  by  the  establishment  of a  manufacturing-zone 
adjacent  to  the  docks.  The  same  development  has  made 
Dunkirk  the  fastest  growing  French  port,  now  ranking 
third  after  Marseilles  and  Le  Havre.  In  1965  exports 
totalled  4.5  million  tons  and imports  11.7  million  tons,  of 
which  6 million  tons  were  petroleum  and  3.5  million  tons 
iron ore.  The proportion of imports to exports has steadily 
increased, and the ratio is  now almost 3 : 1. 
In  1962  a  huge  mineral  dock,  doubling  the  size  of  the 
port, was  opened.  The following  year the integrated steel-
works  of Usinor, fed  by conveyor  belt from  the  quayside, 
began  operations.  In  addition  to  the  steelworks  and  the BP  oil  refinery,  served  by a  new  oil-jetty in  the  old  port, 
other  industries  such  as  sheet-metal  and  rolling  mills  are 
being established to the west of the mineral basin. 
The  transit  trade  to  the  manufacturing  region  of  the 
interior is  effected  largely  by  railways,  recently  electrified, 
and  by road.  The  waterway  system,  on  which  Dunkirk's 
ability  to retain its  hinterland  depends, is  being improved, 
notably  the  deepening  of  the  canal  to  Valenciennes  to 
accommodate  1,350  tons  barges.  Unless  its  waterway 
connections  can  be  further  improved,  Dunkirk  may  lose 
some transit traffic to Antwerp, for already Lorraine potash 
and ore are  moving to the  Scheidt estuary. 
The east coast ports' 
of Britain  · 
Table 5 
Near and short sea trade 
of leading British  east coast ports:  1966 
(by  value - in  £  millions) 
Imports  Exports 
EEC  Total  EEC 
London  205.5  558.7  234.2 
Hull  76.6  208.8  85.5 
Harwich  86.6  141.7  79.6 
Grimsby and 
Immingham  9.8  88.0  4.1 
Felixstowe  40.8  57.0  38.9 
Goole  28.5  49.8  33.3 
Tyne  13.2  57.7  4.3 
Leith  14.9  37.8  13.8 
Ipswich  26.5  32.7  14.4 
Total 
690.2 
244.2 
132.1 
31.2 
61.5 
53.0 
33.6 
28.8 
16.0 
Source :  Digest of Port  Statistics,  1967.  National Ports Council. 
London 
The  Port  of  London's  dominance  of  Britain's  foreign 
trade is long established and today it handles over one-third 
of the  country's  total  exports  and  imports.  The value  of 
goods  handled  is  more  than  twice  that  of  Liverpool,  the 
nearest rival.  London occupies a  leading position in many 
types of freight and particularly in imports of timber, grain, 
textile  fibres  and  foostuffs  and  in  exports  of  machinery, 
chemicals and other manufactured goods.  Although it is  a 
national  port with  a  hinterland  extending  far  beyond  the 
limits of the London Basin, the bulk of the traffic  concerns 
Central and South East England.  This reflects  the import-
ance  of  the  metropolitan  region  as  a  consumer  of  food 
and  raw  materials  and  a  producer  of manufactures.  The 
presence of several refineries on the Thames estuary explains 
the  importance  of oil,  which makes  up almost half of the 
port's  total  trade. 
In recent years  the growth of London's  trade,  especially 
in  general  cargoes, has  been  reduced  by competition  from 
East Anglian  ports  such  as  Felixstowe  and  Ipswich.  But 
its most serious rivals are the continental giants with whom 
it shares  the  West  European  hinterland.  Its  geographical 
position within the great industrial belt which stretches from 
the English Midlands to the Ruhr would seem to encourage 
the  development  of one  of the  "end-ports"  for  the  whole 
region.  Yet in comparison with Rotterdam goods in transit 
are  of  minor  importance  in  London's  trade.  (In  1967 
transhipments  were  2.6  million  t.  out  of  a  total,  foreign 
and  coastwise,  of  60.1  million  t.)  Re-exports  are  signifi-
cant in a  limited  range of goods  such as  raw rubber, furs, 
tea and raw wool. 
Factors  limiting  London's  growth  have  been  the  con-
gestion  in  the  docks  and  the  relative  shallowness  of  the 
Thames estuary.  Thus bulk grain carriers, unable to  enter 
the  estuary,  have  increasingly  begun  to  use  Rotterdam, 
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whence the grain is  transhipped to Britain.  In addition the 
creation of ocean  container berths  at continental harbours 
introduced  the  possibility  of London and  other East coast 
ports  becoming  merely  feeder-terminals. 
To  alleviate  these  difficulties  and  to  meet  continental 
competition  a  major  expansion  has  been  undertaken  at 
Tilbury, which  has  been  primarily a  passenger and transit 
port  with  limited  warehousing  facilities.  This  scheme,  to 
be  completed  in  1969,  is  creating  fourteen  berths  (six  for 
deep-sea  container  ships)  along  two  miles  of  deep  water. 
The number of roll-on/roll-off  quays  and container  berths 
for short-sea traffic  to the continent is  being increased and 
regular  container services  are now  operating to Rotterdam 
and  Dunkirk.  A  deepwater  grain  terminal,  beginning 
operations  in  1969,  will  enable  large  carriers  to  discharge 
quickly. 
The  lower  estuary  has  been  dredged  to  give  access  to 
larger  vessels  and  tankers  of  200,000  tons  are  now  able 
to  dock  at  Thames  Haven.  In  addition  to  the  Tilbury 
development-which  is  likely  to  continue  further  down-
stream-reorganization  has  led  to  the  closure  of  those 
docks  furthest upstream (London Docks)  and the  modern-
ization of the  Royal Group. 
The Medway  ports,  which  rank  fourth  amongst  British 
ports  in  terms  of tonnage  handled,  are  largely  concerned 
with oil traffic  to the Isle of Grain. 
Other east coast ports 
The  increasing  trade  between  Britain  and  the  continent 
is  stimulating  expansion  at  many  harbours  which  serve 
the  short  routes  across  the  North  Sea.  This  growth  in 
traffic, which is particularly significant in trade with Scandi-
navia,  West  Germany  and  the  Low  Countries,  has  been 
facilitated  by  dock  modernization  schemes.  Roll-on/roll-
off  services  for private and commercial  vehicles  have  been 
widely  introduced  to  provide  quick  connections  to  the 
continent.  Thus, for example, Hull is linked to Gothenburg 
and Rotterdam, Immingham to Go  then burg and Amsterdam 
and  Middlesbrough  to  Helsinki,  Sweden  and  Rotterdam. 
The advantages of good inland communications to industrial 
areas  and proximity  to  the  Dutch and  Belgian  coasts  has 
led  to  similar developments  at smaller East Anglian  ports 
and services have been established between Felixstowe and 
Europoort,  King's  Lynn  and  Hamburg,  and Harwich  and 
Zeebrugge.  In many cases the introduction of freight liner-
trains has assisted these  developments. 
These  developments  indicate  the  efforts  being  made  in 
rapidly changing circumstances to establish a  secure role in 
Britain's trade with the continent.  Planning and rationaliza-
tion  may  in  the  future  eliminate  some  of the  competition 
between  the  ports  of  the  East  coast,  but  the  challenge 
presented  by  those  across  the  North Sea  will  remain. 
Conclusion 
The  efficient  functioning  of  their  ports  has  long  been 
vital  to the prosperity of the countries  of Western Europe. 
Technological innovations  and political  decisions  make the 
future  of  individual  ports  uncertain  but the  general  trend 
in favour of harbours affording deep-water access and rapid 
discharging  facilities  for  bulk  cargoes  is  well  established. 
This has led, on the one hand, to the creation of specialized 
ports  handling  a  narrow  range  of  bulk  commodities  and, 
on  the  other,  to  great  engineering  projects  to  enable  the 
major  ports  to  maintain  their  superiority. 
The quick movement of general merchandise, handled in 
unit-cargoes,  is  another  important  feature  of  the  present 
expansion at both large and small  ports around the North 
Sea  basin. 
The enlargement of the EEC and the implementation of 
a  comprehensive  transport  policy  within  the  Community 
are  developments  which  could  have  equally  significant 
effects  in  the  future,  possibly leading  to greater specializa-
tion  and  rationalization  amongst  the  ports  sharing  the 
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The  Kennedy  Round 
By far  the largest and most successful international agreement for  the  reduction  of tariffs 
achieved since  the second world war,  the  Kennedy Round owed its  existence  to  an  initiative 
taken  by  President  Kennedy  in  1962  when  he  obtained  approval  from  the  United  States 
Congress for  the "Trade Expansion Act".  This Act gave the  US President power to negotiate 
much more liberal trade  conditions, especially  lower tariffs,  over a 5-year period. 
This initiative taken by President Kennedy was the direct result of the successful develop-
ment of the Common Market and the British decision in  1961  to try  to join it.  The existence 
of a major negotiating partner-the EEC-was also a major factor  in  ensuring success. 
Started in May 1963,  the  negotiations ended  on  May  16,  1967.  They  were  carried  out 
under  the  aegis  of the  GATT (General  Agreement  of  Tariffs  and  Trade)  set  up  in  1947 
which  with  80  member countries now covers about 80  % of world  trade. 
The General Agreement 
on  Tariffs and Trade 
In  one  sense  the  Kennedy  Round  was  but  the  last 
in a  series  of tariff cutting negotiations to have taken place 
in  the  framework  of  GATT,  but  it  should  certainly  be 
regarded  as  its  most  notable  achievement  so  far.  The 
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade,  signed  in  1947, 
was  originally intended as a  stop-gap until an international 
trade  organization  could  be  set  up.  The  central  feature 
of GATT was-and  still  is  today-an undertaking  by  its 
member countries  (known  as  contracting parties)  to nego-
tiate tariff reductions and agreed tariff levels, and to extend 
these concessions  to all other contracting parties.  Thus if 
one  participating  country  agrees  with  another  to  make  a 
tariff  cut  of  10  % on  the  duty  on  cars  imported  from 
that  country,  the  reduction  must  apply  also  to  duties  on 
cars imported from all  other participating countries. 
Tariff  negotiating  conferences  were  held  by  the  GATT 
at  Geneva  (1947),  Annecy  (1949),  Torquay  (1950),  and 
again  at  Geneva  in  1956,  and  in  1961-1962.  At  these 
sessions,  many  thousands  of  tariff  rates  were  reduced  or 
"frozen".  As  time  passed  the  law  of diminishing  returns 
operated  at  the  bargaining  sessions.  Tariff  reductions 
which caused few  domestic  difficulties  were  relatively  easy 
to  achieve;  but  by  the  end  of  the  nineteen-fifties  most 
reductions  of this  kind had already been negotiated and it 
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became  increasingly  difficult  to  find  mutually  acceptable 
and  balanced  concessions.  The  contracting  parties 
therefore  agreed  that an attempt should  be  made  to base 
future rounds of negotiation on across-the-board tariff cuts 
covering  a  whole  range  of  products  rather  than  on  an 
item-by-item  approach.  Thus  from  the  beginning  the 
Kennedy Round aimed at an across-the-board tariff  reduc-
tion.  It was  hoped  that  this  reduction  would  be  of  the 
order of 50  %. 
The background 
to the Kennedy  Round 
The Trade Expansion Act 
The Kennedy  Round also  differed  from its  predecessors 
in  that it was  strongly  inspired  by  political  motives,  espe-
cially in the United States.  When President Kennedy took 
office  both  he  and  his  advisers  were  anxious  to  take  a 
new  initiative,  strengthening  both  the  political  and  eco-
nomic ties  between the countries of the free world.  In the 
early  1960's  it was  clear  that the  EEC had come  to stay; 
moreover,  in  1961  and  1962,  the  UK  and  several  other 
countries  were  negotiating  entry  into  the  Community. 
President  Kennedy  was  determined  to do  all  he could  to 
develop  closer  Atlantic  ties  and  at  the  same  time  to minimize the  risk  of an enlarged Community being a  rival 
power  bloc,  economically  and  politically,  to  the  United 
States. 
Without  this  political  background  it  is  unlikely  that 
President  Kennedy  would  ever  have  sought,  still  less 
obtained,  approval  from  Congress  for  the  Trade  Expan-
sion  Act.  In  passing  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  in  1962, 
Congress  gave  the  President  a  5-year  mandate  to  negoti-
ate cuts  up 50  % in  US tariffs  against equivalent conces-
sions elsewhere. 
The  prospect  that  the  EEC  would  shortly  be  enlarged, 
particularly  through  British  membership,  also  led  the 
Congress to grant the President special powers to reduce to 
zero the tariffs  on products for which the external trade of 
the  enlarged  EEC  and  the  United  States  together  would 
account  for  80  %,  or  more  of  world  trade.  This 
would  have  implied  virtual  Atlantic  free  trade  on  many 
products. 
The European  position 
But,  alas  for  Kennedy's  Grand  Design  for  an  Atlantic 
Community, Britain's application  to join the EEC came  to 
nothing and part of the political driving  force  disappeared 
from  the desire  to see  lower  transatlantic tariffs. 
It was  still  hoped  however  that  the  tariff  reductions 
envisaged  as  part of the  Kennedy  Round would  go  some 
considerable  way  towards  reducing  trade  barriers  within 
the  Western  World.  Indeed,  in  some  countries,  notably 
the  UK,  the  Kennedy  Round came  to  be  looked upon as 
a  kind  of second-best  trade  policy  to  membership  of the 
Community. 
The  Kennedy  Round  was  moreover  of  great  political 
importance  to the  EEC since  it was  the  first  major inter-
national  negotiation 1  where  the  Community  spoke  with 
a  single  voice.  The six  countries  were  represented  in the 
Geneva talks  by an EEC Commission negotiating  team led 
by M.  Jean Rey, then Commission member responsible for 
external  relations,  and  since  July  1967  President  of  the 
Commission.  The six  countries  were  thus  forced  to adopt 
common  viewpoints  on  many  aspects  of  trade  policy 
earlier  than  might  otherwise  have  happened.  While  the 
need for the Commission to consult and gain the approval 
of six instead of one government made it at times a  rather 
unwieldy  negotiating  partner,  the  size  and  importance  of 
the  EEC and  the  fact  that it was  acting  as  a  single  unit, 
also  meant  that  the  prizes  for  success  were  that  much 
greater.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  strengthened  its 
position and allowed it to speak  on  equal  terms  with  the 
USA,  thus  ensuring  a  greater  degree  of  reciprocal  liber-
alization. 
Agriculture,  non-tariff  barriers 
and developing countries 
The  Kennedy  negotiations  differed  from  the  traditional 
GATT pattern in other respects too.  It was hoped that the 
cuts  would  cover  tariffs  on  agricultural  as  well  as  indus-
trial  goods.  Trade barriers  in  the  agricultural  sector  take 
the form of quantitative controls and domestic  agricultural 
support programmes  rather  than  tariffs.  It was  hoped  to 
modify  these  policies  so  as  to  allow  a  higher  degree  of 
international  division  of  labour  in  agriculture  as  well  as 
manufacturing industry.  Western Europe is  a  very  impor-
1  It was  also  true  of  the  earlier  but  less  important  GATT  negotia-
tions of 1961-1962. 
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tant market for  United States  agricultural  products.  Con-
gress  was  therefore  not  prepared  to  accept  the  tariff 
reducing  provisions  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  without 
an  assurance  that,  in  return  for  industrial  tariff  cuts  by 
the  US  the  countries  of Western Europe-and particularly 
the  EEC  whose  agricultural  policies  appeared  to  be  a 
direct  threat  to  United  States  farming  interests-would 
grant freer entry for agricultural goods.  Accordingly, when 
the  first  moves  were  made  in  GATT  to  prepare  the 
Kennedy  Round,  it was  agreed  that negotiations  on  trade 
in agricultural products should be an integral feature of the 
bargaining.  This  was  of  immediate  interest  not  only  to 
the  United  States,  but  also  to  other  primary  producing 
countries,  whether  they  were  high  income  ones,  like 
Australia  and  New  Zealand,  or  whether  they  were  at 
relatively  early  stages  of development. 
A further innovation of the negotiations was  the decision 
to  include  a  whole  range  of  so-called  non-tariff  barriers, 
such  as  anti-dumping  policies,  the  use  of  arbitrary  or 
excessive  values  for  customs  purposes,  government  pur-
chasing policies and an array of technical regulations which 
might be  deemed  to hinder trade. 
Finally,  but  by  no  means  least  important,  when  the 
Ministers  of  the  leading  Contracting  Parties  met  for  pre-
liminary discussions in Spring 1963  they agreed that the less 
developed  countries,  although  they  would  receive  most-
favoured-nation benefits agreed to among the industrialized 
countries, would not be expected to make tariff concessions 
themselves. 
In short the Kennedy Round was  originally conceived of 
as much more than a routine series of negotiations on tariffs; 
it was  to be  a  package  deal,  involving  not only  a  bigger 
general  reduction  of  tariffs  than  had  hitherto  been 
achieved,  but also  the  loosening  of other impediments  on 
free  trade  (particularly  in  agricultural  products)  and  the 
provision  of  wider  trade  opportunities  to  developing 
countries. 
The neg.otiations open 
The negotiations  proper began in May  1964.  They soon 
ran into difficulties,  partly because  the  leading Contracting 
Parties  did  not  start  with  tariff  levels  which  were  even 
roughly  similar.  United  States  tariffs,  for  example,  were 
much higher  than those  of the EEC, and Switzerland  and 
the Scandinavian countries had lower tariffs than either the 
UK  or  the  EEC.  This  was  known  as  the  problem  of 
disparities  and,  despite  18  months  of hard bargaining,  no 
general  solution  was  found.  This  was  partly  because  of 
the  extreme complexity of any comparison. 
In  effect  while  some  tariffs  are  assessed  on  quantities 
imported  (specific  duties)  others  are  calculated  on  values 
imported  (ad  valorem  duties).  Some  countries  have  more 
detailed  tariff  nomenclatures  than  others;  some  tariffs  are 
subject  to  seasonal  variation.  A  more  fundamental 
problem  arises  in  deciding  whether  to  measure  the 
weighted  or  unweighted  average  height  of  a  tariff.  If a 
country  spends  more  on  importing  commercial  vehicles 
than  on  importing  farm  tractors,  then  it  would  seem 
reasonable  for  more  weight  to  be  given  to  the  customs 
duties  on  imported  commercial vehicles  than  to  those  on 
imported  tractors.  But  this  method  of  calculation  does 
not give  adequate consideration to the effects  of very high 
duties  in  discouraging  imports.  Accordingly,  it  is  often 
more  sensible  to  use  unweighted  rather  than  weighted 
arithmetic  averages. Some attempts  have however been made to compare the 
relative  "heights"  of  tariff  structures  of various  countries 
in spite of these difficulties.  When the Kennedy discussions 
started  the  EEC  Statistical  Office  made  one  of  the  most 
up-to-date studies of unweighted tariff levels.  According to 
these  calculations,  the  arithmetic  average  of the  common 
external  tariff  of the  EEC  for  all  industrial  materials  and 
manufactures  was  11.7  %;  the  average  United  States 
tariff  on  similar  products  was  17.8  % and  that  of  the 
United  Kingdom  18.4  %.  Some  idea  of  the  relative 
tariff heights  before the Kennedy cuts  became  operative is 
obtainable from Table  1. 
they  were  disappointing.  But  in  the  case  of  tariffs  on 
industrial  products  the  cuts  finally  agreed  proved  con-
siderably bigger than seemed at one time possible.  During 
the negotiations, it became an open secret that most of the 
leading  participants  would  have  regarded  their  labours  as 
being  worth while if they  emerged  with average tariff cuts 
of  as  little  as  25  %.  In  the  event,  in  May  1967  they 
were  able  to  announce  average  tariff  cuts  on  industria] 
products  of  about  35  %.  For  some  6,000  products  the 
full cut of 50 % was made. 
The  UK  agreed  to  make  reductions  amounting  to  an 
average  of 37  % on tariff  on  goods  from  the  EEC,  and 
TABLE  1  Average tariff levels for non-agricultural products before planned cuts 
average 
tariff % 
•  Community 
8,1 
18.0 
21.3 
19,4 
18,4 
Source:  EEC. 
Raw materials 
and energy 
(192  tariff 
groups) 
Semi-finished 
goods 
(1 ,677  tariff 
groups) 
Capital 
equipment 
(588  tariff 
groups) 
Other  products 
(1,303  tariff 
groups) 
All non-
agricultural 
products 
In addition  to  tariff  disparities  there  was  the  problem 
of "exceptions", i.e.  products which one  or another country 
wished to exclude entirely or partially from the negotiations 
for  special  reasons  of  national  interest.  The  EEC  for 
example  listed  lories,  buses,  computers  and  nuclear 
reactors,  where  their  industry  is  weak  by  comparison 
with  Britain  or the  USA  as  exceptions;  the  USA  refused 
to include petroleum. 
Both  "disparities"  and  "exceptions"  were  solved  in 
practice  by  detailed  negotiation-quite  contrary  to  the 
principle of across-the-board cuts which it had been hoped 
would  apply.  There  were  fears  that  this  detailed 
bargaining  would  make  the  general  negotiation  far  too 
complicated and prevent agreement within  the  deadline  of 
five  years agreed to by the US Congress.  However enough 
of the initial determination to achieve major cuts remained 
for  progress  to  be  possible  and  lists  of  exceptions  and 
disparities  in  fact  grew  shorter  as  the  negotiations 
advanced. 
The results 
Success  in cutting industrial  tariffs 
What are  the  fruits  of the  three  years  hard  labour  by 
the  negotiators?  At one  stage  it  looked  as  if they  would 
be very meagre indeed; and as  we  shall see, in some fields 
3 
40  % on  goods  imported  from  the  USA.  Some  idea  of 
the impact of these  cuts can be gained when it is  realized 
that the  duty  on tyres  will fall  from  24  % to  12  %,  on 
leather  footwear  from  10-20  % to  5-10  %,  on  textile 
machinery from 12-40  % to 7.5-20  %.  on office machinery 
(e.g.  typewriters)  10-20  % to  3-7.5  %.  On photographic 
equipment the duty falls  from  15-50  % to 7.5-20  %,  and 
on gramophones, records and tape-recorders from 10-33  % 
to  5-12.5  %.  The duty  on  cars  will  fall  from  25  % to 
11  %. 
In its  turn the EEC will  reduce  duties  on a  wide  range 
of products  of export interest  to the  UK.  These  include 
cars and parts (from 29  % to 11  %),  photographic equip-
ment  (from  12-18  % to 7-13  %),  and furniture  (17  % to 
8.5  %).  It is  estimated  that  the  total  value  of  British 
exports affected by these  reductions  by the EEC was  over 
£600 millions in 1964, or 85  % of total UK dutiable exports 
to the  Community. 
The US  will  make  very  significant  reductions  in  import 
duties,  including  that on cars from  8.5  % to  3  %.  china-
ware  25-35  % to  12.5-17.5  % and  gramophones  11.5  % 
to  5.5  %.  The  1964  value  of  UK  exports  to  the  US 
affected by the reductions is estimated at about £300 millions. 
In the closing weeks, difficulty  centred round two groups 
of  products,  chemicals  and  steel.  In  chemicals,  the  US 
has  been  in  the  habit  of  valuing  imports  for  customs 
purposes,  not  on  the  basis  of  import  or  foreign  export 
prices,  but upon a  somewhat arbitrary price at which  the 
products  might  have  been  expected  to  sell  in  the  US market.  This device  known as  the American Selling Price 
System (ASP) resulted in duties on certain chemicals as high 
as  170  %  ad  valorem.  The  EEC  and  the  UK  were 
determined to see  the end of this system and would make 
only  a  provisional  cut  of  20  %  on  their  chemical 
duties  until  the  US  Government  was  in  a  position  to 
terminate  the  ASP  system.  At  the  time  of writing,  ASP 
had  not  yet  been  abolished  and  the  Community  and 
Britain were  still reserving their own positions. 
As  regards  the  implementation  of  the  tariff  cuts  the 
participating  countries  have  a  choice  of  time-tables,  but 
undertake  to  complete  their  reductions  by  January  1972. 
By  that  date  the  UK  average  tariff  on  manufactured 
industrial  goods  will  be  about  10.2  %;  for  the  US 
it  will  be  11.2  % and  for  the  EEC  it  will  be  as  low 
as  7.6  %.  Some  idea  of  the  future  shape  of  the 
tariff of the three is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Some typical tarift cuts resulting from the Kennedy round 
(per cent ad valorem duties) 
A. Pre-Kennedy Round level 
B.  Post-Kennedy Round level (i.e.  from 1 January 1972) 
Product  I A~c  B  I, __  A_u_K  __  B __  A_u_sA_B  __ 
Synthetic fibre yams  19  9.5  24  13  32  10.5-25 
Woven fabrics of 
synthetic fibre  21  13  22  17.5  46  3.2-30 
Domestic glassware  24  15.5  21  15.5  35  10-30 
Rotary printing 
presses  11  4.5  15  7.5  12.5  6 
Passenger cars  29  11  30  11  8.5  3-5.5 
Watches  13  7.5  30  17  46  8.5-16 
TV and radio sets  22  14  17.5-30  15  12.5  5 
Dolls  25  16  25  12.5  36  17.5 
Electric shavers  13  6.5  15-17.5  7.5  14-20  6.5 
Typewriters  16  6.5  10-20  3-7.5  0-13  0-5.5 
Source:  EEC  and  Atlantic  Tariffs  and  Trade  (PEP). 
a  The  common  external  tariff:  the  arithmetical  average  of  the  six 
national  tariffs  for  1957,  less  cuts  agreed  in  the  1961-1962  GATT 
negotiations.  The CET at  this  basic  rate  was  never  fully  implemented 
because  the  first  stafe  of  the  Kennedy  Round  cuts  were  carried  out 
on  1  July  1968,  the  same  date  on  which  the  final  alignments  of  the 
national  tariffs  on the CET were  due. 
Disappointment in other fields 
While  in  terms  of  reducing  tariffs  on  industrial  goods 
most  people  regard  the  Kennedy  Round  negotiations  as 
very  successful,  this  cannot also  be  said  of  other  aspects 
of the negotiations.  Little progress was made on non-tarift 
barriers  apart from  the American  Selling  Price  package-
still  not confirmed by the  US Congress,  the  agreement by 
France and Italy to look into the  possibilities  of induring 
the  high  road  tax  on  big-engined  cars,  and  a  resolution 
to agree on an anti-dumping code. 
Success in reducing trade barriers on agricultural products 
was  also  very  limited,  for  if it is  true  that a  number  of 
duties  on  these  goods  were  reduced,  the  reductions  were 
in  general  substantially  less  than  on  industrial  goods. 
Virtually  no progress  was  made  in  modifying  agricultural 
support programmes,  which  was  particularly  disappointing 
in  view  of  the  length  of  time  spent  in  negotiations  on 
agricultural policies.  Indeed agreement to get down to the 
detailed  negotiations  in  the  industrial  sector  was  delayed 
by  fruitless  attempts  to  reach  agreement  on  agriculture. 
The one important decision in agriculture of special interest 
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to  less  developed  country  participants  was  the  agreement 
to raise from July 1968  the International Wheat Agreement 
minimum  and  maximum  prices  of  hard  wheat.  The 
increases  are  fairly  modest,  however.  For  example,  for 
one important type, hard red winter wheat of basic quality, 
the  minimum  and  maximum  increases  are  5.4  %  and 
4.4  %  respectively.  Slightly  more  dramatic  was  the 
decision  of  the  high  income  countries  (both  producing 
and  consuming  countries)  to  contribute  to  less  developed 
countries the equivalent of 4.5 m tons per annum of wheat 
as  a  long  term  aid  programme.  The  US  will  contribute 
42  %,  the  EEC 23  %,  Canada  11  % and the  UK 5  %. 
In general, however, the less developed countries emerged 
from the negotiations profoundly disappointed.  As we have 
seen, virtually no progress was made in providing for freer 
access  for  their  primary  product  exports,  and  as  regards 
manufactures,  the  tariff  cuts  tended  to  be  deeper  on 
products  of interest  to  other  industrialized  countries  than 
on  those  of interest  to  less  developed  countries.  Sectors 
in  which  the  less  developed  countries  are especially inter-
ested  include  foodstuffs,  beverages,  oils  and  fats,  textile 
products,  clothing  and  footwear.  These  categories  all 
received less  than average cuts.  Indeed clothing and foot-
wear,  of  very  especial  export  interest  to  less  developed 
countries,  look  like  providing  "peaks"  in  the  future  tariff 
structure of industrialized countries.  It has been estimated 
that  whereas  only  about  16  %  of  the  value  of  all 
manufactured  imports  into  industrialized  countries  re-
mained unaffected by the tariff reductions, for manufactures 
of  interest  to  the  less  developed  countries,  no  less  than 
24  %  failed  to  obtain  any  reduction.  At  the  other 
end  of  the  scale,  55  %  of  the  import  trade  of  the 
developed  countries  received  cuts  of  50  %  or  more, 
whilst  on  products  of  especial  interest  to  less  developed 
countries,  only 47  % was  affected in this  way. 
Conclusion 
Nonetheless  the  Kennedy-Round  can  be  considered  a 
major achievement, primarily of benefit to the industrialized 
countries  but  since  the  tariff  concessions  are  open  to  all 
GATT members  including  the  developing  countries,  bene-
ficial  at least to some degree  to all.  It achieved far more 
in terms  of tariff cuts than any previous multilateral nego-
tiations of its kind and though this was less than was hoped 
for  at  first,  it  remained-at  an  average  of  35  % 
cuts of all tariffs  on manufactures-far more than at times 
seemed possible.  Coming after previous GATT negotiations, 
it  is  likely  to  be  seen  in  future  as  the  culmination  of  a 
long  post-1945  process  of  liberalization  resulting  in  a 
situation  where  most manufactures  imported into Western 
Europe  and  the  USA  will  face  tariffs  as  low  as  5-15  %. 
In these circumstances  tariffs  themselves  become far less 
important  than  the  many  other  obstacles  to  trade  known 
as  non-tariff  barriers.  In dealing  with  these  the  Kennedy 
Round  was  much  less  successful.  But  attention  is  likely 
to  turn  increasingly  towards  these  barriers  in  the  future 
when the effects of the tariff cuts begin to be felt.  And the 
experience  within  EEC  and  EFTA  in  attacking  these 
problems  on a  regional  basis  is  then likely  to be  of value 
for a  wider approach. 
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The  motor industry  in  the 
European  Community and  Britain 
The  automobile  industry  plays  a  central  role  in  the  economy  of  the  European  Com-
munity-particularly in Germany, France and Italy-just as it does in the UK.  Its importance 
has  become so great  that any  crisis  in  this  industry affects  many  other sectors  and  weakens 
the  economy as  a  whole.  In  turn,  it  is  itself very  sensitive  to  general  economic  fluctuation. 
Only in  the Benelux countries,  where,  with  only one national manufacturer,  the  main activity 
is  the assembly of foreign  vehicles,  is  the  industry  relatively  unimportant. 
I.  Structure 
Position in the economy 
The  automobile  industry  is  a  very  important  customer 
of other industries.  In  France,  for  example,  the  industry 
absorbs, each year, 90%  of the production of safety glass 
and 50 % of the rubber, 50 % of the fine  and special steel, 
50 % of shaped aluminium products and 21  % of the sheet 
metal produced.  In Britain, it uses  12 % of all  deliveries 
of finished steel of every type. 
It is  also  a  leading  employer:  1.4  million  French  men 
and  women  or  5 %  of  the  total  work  force,  gain  their 
living from the industry.  In the UK, half-a-million people 
are directly employed in the industry and many thousands 
of others work for component manufacturers.  Italy's Fiat 
has  134,000  people  on its  payroll,  Germany's  Volkswagen 
100,000. 
The motor companies are among the largest of European 
firms:  Volkswagen, Fiat and Renault are the leading com-
panies in Germany, Italy and France.  The industry is  also 
a  prime contributor to a  country's finances,  from the point 
of view both of fiscal  revenue (18  % of French tax revenue, 
for  instance)  and  of exports-British  Leyland  Motor Cor-
poration is  the UK's leading  single  exporting firm. 
The growth of the industry 
The European motor industry begins with the foundation 
in  1890  of the  German firm  Daimler  Motoren.  The first 
French  car,  built  by  Panhard  and  Levassor,  who  had 
acquired manufacturing rights for the Daimler engine, took 
the road in 1891;  the Daimler Motor Co. began production 
in Coventry in 1896, the same year that the first British car, 
designed  by  Lanchester,  had  its  initial  trials.  Fiat  was 
formed in  1899.  Up to  1914  progress  was  slow  and con-
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struction  still  a  matter  of  pioneering  and  craftsmanship. 
In 1913  France produced more than 40,000 vehicles, Britain 
34,000  and  Italy  6,000.  In the  USA,  on  the  other hand, 
the  breakthrough  had  been  spectacular:  4,000  vehicles  in 
1900,  187,000  in  1910,  970,000  in  1915  and  2  million  in 
1920. 
The  First World  War  confirmed  the  use  of  the  motor 
vehicle  and,  with  the  introduction  of  mass  production 
methods,  the  great  growth  began  which  continued  up  to 
the  slump.  On the  Continent the  number of firms  multi-
plied,  though  in  the  UK  they  declined  from  88  in  1922 
to 31  in 1929.  In the latter year, with American production 
at 5.3  million vehicles,  total output in France was  254,000, 
in Britain 239,000, in Germany 156,000 and in Italy 55,000. 
The great economic crisis caused many mergers and wiped 
out the smallest firms.  The Italian industry was  especially 
badly hit and divided into two sectors:  the mass producers 
personified  by  Fiat,  and  the  others,  led  by  Ferrari,  who 
clung  to the  old  idea  of the car as  a  luxury, custom-built 
article for a  moneyed minority. 
The British motor industry was less affected by the slump. 
An upward trend in production continued:  in 1937  Britain 
became second to the USA as a motor vehicle manufacturer, 
producing  379,000  cars  and  114,000  commercial  vehicles. 
Britain's  comparatively  favourable  experience  has  been 
attributed to the rather slow rate of growth in the industry 
during  the twenties,  growth in real  per  capita  income  and 
taxes  favourable  to  British  cars.  Production  in  the  USA 
and Continental Europe did  not regain  the levels  of 1929 
until after the Second World War. 
During the war, car production in the UK fell practically 
to zero though more commercial vehicles  were  turned  out. 
On the Continent, many factories  were  destroyed  or badly damaged  but,  thanks  to  Marshall  Aid,  post-war  recovery 
was  swift  and  the  level  of  1938  was  passed  by  1950.  In 
that  year  British  car  production  topped  the  half-million 
mark for the first time.  (Later developments in production 
are given in Section II.) 
Vertical integration 
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The  automobile  industry  could  not  exist  without  two 
types  of  suppliers:  the  raw  material  producers-steel, 
rubber, glass, paint and textile firms-and the subcontractors 
who  make  the  components  and  accessories-electrical 
equipment of all kinds,  brakes, carburetors, seats,  etc.  As 
a  general  rule,  the European  motor industry,  unlike  parts 
of  the  American  industry,  does  not  have  financial  links 
with  these  suppliers  nor  does  it  make  the  materials  or 
components itself.  Its "vertical integration" is, in economic 
jargon, "weak". 
There  are,  however,  some  exceptions.  In  Germany 
Krupp,  essentially  a  steel  giant,  produces  commercial 
vehicles;  two  other  commercial  vehicle  firms,  Man  and 
Vidal, belong to steel companies.  The Flick group controls 
Daimler Benz.  In France, the  Michelin tire group has  an 
important  interest  in  Citroen;  Renault  has  its  own  steel 
works  and also makes  machine  tools.  Fiat has integrated 
metallurgical  raw  material  supplies  for  its  own  needs.  In 
Britain,  British  Leyland  owns  Mulliners,  a  component 
manufacturer.  In  general  the  sub-contractors,  while 
financially  independent  of  the  motor  firms,  are  strongly 
"horizontally integrated."  They are  comparatively  few  in 
number  in  some  important  sectors,  because  of  mergers, 
and  have  large  market  shares.  Examples  are  the  brake 
firms  of Ferodo,  Bendix and Lockheed;  and Solex,  which 
supplies  all  the  French  carburetor  market,  two-thirds  of 
the German and half the British and Italian markets.  Lucas 
is  an outstanding  British case  of a  firm  with a  dominating 
position in a component field-electrical equipment. 
There  are  also  the  body-building  firms,  of  two  types. 
First,  there  are  the  de  luxe  companies  (e.g.,  the  famous 
Italians Ghia and Pinin Farina) who are closer to the world 
of haute couture than to an assembly line and who are the 
descendants  of  the  early  craftsmen  motor  producers.  In 
Europe they have a  fairly small market of high purchasing 
power  but are  gaining  in  importance  in  the  USA,  where 
the  "dress"  of a  car is  an essential selling  point.  Second, 
there are companies which make special vehicles-medium 
and  heavy  commercial  vehicles,  ambulances,  caravans, 
coaches, etc.  In the EEC most of the body-builders have 
retained  their independence,  but in  Britain  this  is  the area 
where the most vertical integration has taken place:  British 
Leyland  owns  Pressed  Steel  and Ford now  has  control  of 
Briggs  Motor Bodies. 
Horizontal integration 
2 
Horizontal  integration has gone far-and farthest  of all 
in  Britain.  Only  the  firms  of  the  greatest  size  have 
survived, apart from a  few  specialist producers. 
In  Germany,  since  the  absorption  of  Auto-Union  by 
Daimler  Benz  in  19583  and  the  disappearance  of  the 
Borgward  group  in  1962,  four  firms  supplied  89  %  of 
the 2.5  million cars and light commercial vehicles produced 
in  1967:  Volkswagen  47  %,  Opel  22  %,  Ford  10%  and 
Daimler Benz  10 %.  The balance comes from NSU, which 
developed  the  Wankel  rotary  engine,  BMW  which  is 
gaining ground rapidly and a  few  small firms.  The largest 
lorry  manufacturer  is  Rheinstahl-Hanomag,  a  steel  firm. 
1 The integration in a single company or group of companies of several 
consecutive stages of manufacture and distribution e.g.  iron ore -+ steel 
-+cars. 
2  Integration of firms  at the same stage  of manufacturing or distribu-
tion. 
3  Since then Volkswagen has acquired an important interest. 
In France,"' where there were  200  manufacturers in  1914 
and  22  in  1938,  four  firms  now  account  for  99  %  of  the 
total  production  of  2  million  vehicles:  Renault-Saviem 
40  %,  Citroen-Berliet 26  %,  Peugeot 20%  and Simca  (the 
French subsidiary of the  US  Chrysler Company)  14 %. 
In Italy,"'  concentration is  even more marked:  one firm, 
Fiat,  produced  86  % of  the  1.54  million  vehicles  manu-
factured,  and  Alfa-Romeo  5.5 %.  The  other  firms-
Maserati,  Innocenti,  Lancia  and Ferrari-are in  the  haute 
couture range. 
In  the  Benelux 
4  countries,  there  is  only  one  national 
producer,  the  Dutch  firm  of  DAF,  founded  in  1948. 
Despite  a  healthy  growth  in  recent  years,  its  production 
is  still no more than 100,000 vehicles a  year.  Most of the 
output  comes  from  foreign-owned  assembly  plants  in 
Belgium,  of which  the  most important are Ford (German 
and British), GMC (German and British)-both, of course, 
under American ownership-and Renault-Rambler (French/ 
American). 
In Britain 
4  four groups now produce approximately 99 % 
of  all  vehicles.  British  Leyland  Motor  Corporation  was 
formed  in  May  1968  by  the  merger  of  the  two  largest 
British-controlled automobile manufacturers,  British  Motor 
Holdings  and  Leyland  Motors.
5  It produced  about 46  % 
of the total production of 1.944 million vehicles, Ford 27  %, 
Vauxhall around 15  %.  Rootes about 11  %.  Nearly all the 
commercial  vehicles  are  produced  by  these  four  groups, 
especially  the lighter vehicles  of up to 6  tons  which  com-
prise almost 80% of the market.  BLMC makes  one third 
of  all  commercial  vehicles,  but  Vauxhall  is  by  far  the 
biggest  maker  of  vehicles  of  under  2  tons.  There  are 
some  15  other commercial  vehicle  specialists  and  13  firms 
producing  luxury  and  sports  cars-e.g.,  Rolls-Royce  and 
Bentley,  Aston  Martin,  Lotus  and  Jensen.  Unlike  most 
other  countries,  Britain  mass  produces  sports  cars  (both 
BLMC and Rootes); it is  also the only country to specialize 
in the production of double-decker buses. 
In the EEC, there is a  certain amount of state participa-
tion.  Renault, the main French firm, has been nationalized; 
Alfa-Romeo is  controlled by Finmeccanica, the engineering 
branch of the state holding company IRI;  since  1961,  the 
Federal Government and the Land of Lower Saxony have 
each  held  20 %  of  the  shares  of  Volkswagen  and  thus 
have  effective  control  as  the  60 % of  shares  in  private 
hands  are  very  widely  dispersed.  Extension  of  public 
intervention  seems,  however,  unlikely,  nor  can  any  such 
developments be expected in the UK. 
Geographical location 
The  need  to  be close  to  its  raw  material  suppliers,  its 
subcontractors,  an  abundant  labour  supply  and  its  main 
outlets  caused  the  motor  industry  to  develop  in  or  near 
large centres  of population.  Thus, three of the four large 
French car firms  are in  the  Paris  region;  90%  of Italian 
production  is  centred  on  Milan  and  Turin;  the  British 
industry  has  been  concentrated  in  the  Midlands  and  the 
South-East.  In  Germany  the  industry  is  more  widely 
spread  and  the  smaller  firms  in  all  countries  are  also 
scattered. 
This  centralization,  strongest  in  France,  is  not  without 
its  problems.  Continual  growth in production means  that 
factories  have  to  be  enlarged,  which  may  be  difficult  in 
metropolitan areas.  A  modern production unit, moreover, 
4  All figures are 1967. 
5  BMH itself was  formed  in 1966  following  a  merger between British 
Motor Corp.-itself a  result  of a  merger in  1962  between  the  Nuffield 
group and Austin-and the body-builders Pressed Steel.  Leyland Motors 
was  born in  1962  on the merger of the  original  Leyland  Company and 
Standard-Triumph;  it absorbed Rover and Alvis  in 1966.  Jaguar is  also 
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others  D aimler  Benz needs  more  room  for  parking  areas  and  depots  than  it 
does for plant.  There is  thus an incentive for motor firms 
to  decentralize,  so  long  as  material  and  component 
supply is  not made too expensive  and labour is  available. 
Because  a  car  has  a  high  value-weight  ratio,  the  cost  of 
delivering the finished product is  not very important.  Com-
panies  have  been  encouraged  by  the  state  to decentralize 
and have been offered inducements to move to areas where 
unemployment is above the average. 
In France,  Renault has  advanced  down  the  Seine  from 
Paris  to  Le  Havre.  Renault-Saviem  is  established  at Caen 
and  is  planning  to  set  up  a  new  plant  at  Nantes.  But 
dispersal is  not very far advanced. Nor is  it in Italy where 
automobile  production  is  still  concentrated  in  the  North 
of  the  country  (success  in  attracting  firms  to  set  up  in 
southern Italy,  where  heavy  unemployment is  chronic, has 
been more marked in heavy industries such as  steel).  The 
only  example  of  automobile  decentralization  in  Italy  is 
the big  plant now being  built by Alfa-Romeo near Naples, 
with participation by IRI. 
Decentralization has  gone much further in  Britain.  The 
industry has  spent more than  £200  million  in  the  last few 
years  on  expansion  and  modernization  and  a  large  pro-
portion  of this  has  gone  to the  building  of new  plants in 
areas  of high  unemployment.  BMC  moved  all  its  heavy 
commercial vehicle production to Bathgate in Scotland and 
set  up  new  factories  in  South  Wales  and  on  Merseyside; 
BLMC has  further plans for expansion in the development 
areas.  Ford  now  has  an  integrated  car-body  factory  at 
Halewood, near Liverpool, and plans to add a  transmission 
plant in the same region.  Rootes  opened a  big  new plant 
at Linwood, near Paisley, in 1963.  Vauxhall's  Mersey-side 
expansion projects date from  1960. 
II.  Production  and  markets 
The motor industry has to produce for two very different 
markets:  commercial vehicles and private cars.  The former 
is  relatively  stable  and follows  trends  that  broadly  reflect 
the general state of the economy.  But commercial vehicles 
make up only a  fairly small proportion of total production 
in Britain and the EEC.  The situation is  radically different 
in the USSR and Japan. 
Motor vehicle production:  1967  and 1968  (thousands) 
1967  1968 
Total  I 
Passenger I  Commercial  Provisional 
cars  vehicles  total 
EEca  6,262  5,707  555 
Germany  2,483  2,296  187  3,100 
France  2,010  1,777  233  2,070 
Italy  1,542  1,439  103  1,600 
Netherlands  56  49  7 
Belgium  189  164  25 
UK  1,944  1,560  384  2,100 
USA  8,988  7,404  1,584  10,900 
USSR  732  252  480 
Japan  3,132  1,914  1,218  4,000 
a  Total  after  eliminating  duplication  due  to  the  fact  that  vehicles 
manufactured in one Community country and assembled in another have 
been counted in the figures for both. 
Source:  Statistical Office of the European Communities, General Statistical 
bulletin 1968,  No.  10. 
In the EEC the private car production sector is  the most 
important.  It is  a  far less  certain and less  rational market 
than that for commercial vehicles, but the industry's future 
health  depends  on  it.  The  same  is  broadly  true  for  the 
UK, although Britain is  the largest European manufacturer 
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of commercial  vehicles.  While  car production  has  grown 
spectacularly in Europe since the war, capacity and markets 
do not always correspond. 
Trade cycle difficulties 
In  the  last  few  years,  sudden  falls  in  car  sales  have 
interrupted  the  steady  growth  that  succeeded  the  end  of 
the  war and have forced  the motor companies  to readjust 
their  production  as  stocks  built  up.  Nevertheless,  the 
market is  so considerable  that the  future  for  the  industry 
can  harctly  be  anything  but  favourable.  The  EEC  has 
180  million  inhabitants  and  saturation  in  the  automobile 
market has  by  no means  been  achieved,  despite  the rapid 
growth  of the number  of vehicles  on the roads:  5 million 
m  1953,  14  million in 1960 and 35  million in 1967.  There 
is  now  one  vehicle  for  every  seven  people,  the  density 
reached in the  USA in 1920/1921. 
This  lag  behind  the  USA  presages  a  fairly  favourable 
future  for  the  European  industry.  Purchasing  power  is 
rising,  hire purchase is  becoming more widespread,  leisure 
and mobility are increasing.  All these factors are encourag-
ing  the  growth  of car  ownership,  which  has  been  further 
boosted by the introduction of small popular cars. 
The evolution of the market 
There  have  been  four  stages  in  the  evolution  of  the 
automobile market: 
First, a period of rapid and regular growth in production 
corresponding to strong demand, shortages and long delivery 
delays.  In  Britain  and  the  EEC  this  period  lasted  from 
1945  to 1958/1960. 
Second,  a  period  when  the  market  settles  down  and 
something  of  a  balance  between  supply  and  demand  is 
achieved:  competition between makes and models becomes 
very  keen.  These  were  the  characteristics  of  the  market 
in Europe in the early 60s. 
ln  the  third  stage,  reached  in  Britain  and  the  EEC 
during  the  last  three  or four  years,  replacements  become 
increasingly  important.  In France,  for  example,  16  %  of 
sales  were  replacements  in  1959.  By  1965  the  rate  for 
France was 40  %, for Germany 35% and for Britain 42  %· 
lt is  expected  that  the  demand  for  replacements  will 
represent more than half total sales in 1970.  Signs  of this 
change  on  the  market  are  second-hand  sales  and  swifter 
depreciation.  The average  life  of a  car is  getting  shorter: 
it is now 13 years in the EEC and 10 in the USA. 
The  fourth  phase,  scarcely  begun  in  Europe  but  well 
advanced in the  USA, is marked by the appearance of the 
second family  car.  In the EEC, 2% of households had a 
second  car in 1959  and 3.5  %  in  1964;  the  estimated per-
centage for  1970  is  6.  In the USA, more than  10  million 
families already possess two cars. 
The  shift  to  a  replacement  market  has  very  important 
results  and sensitivity to cyclical trends  becomes  extremely 
acute.  Both in Britain and the EEC, the car industry has 
been much affected  by the tendency  of governments  to use 
changes  in  the  volume  of  car  sales  as  a  main  regulator 
of  the  economy.  Demand  has  frequently  been  damped 
down  by  means  of  credit  restriction,  taxation  and  hire 
purchase deposit requirements. 
Competition 
Competition  within  the  EEC,  eased  by the  abolition  of 
tariffs,  has  led  to  increase  trade  in  automobiles  between 
the member states. 
In  France,  imported  vehicles  represent  about  14%  of 
new  registrations  in  1966.  47.7  %  of  imported  vehicles 
came  from  Germany,  30.7%  from  Italy and  12.6%  from 
the  UK;  the  balance  came  from  the  USA,  Sweden,  the 
USSR and Japan. In Germany,  56%  of the  200,000  vehicles  imported  in 
1966  came from France (with  Renault in a  clear lead) and 
39  %  from  Italy-Fiat  being  the  biggest  supplier  of  all, 
with 72,400 vehicles. 
In Italy, the actual number of cars imported has fallen in 
recent years  but, as  a  proportion of new  registrations, has 
remained  around  the  20 %  mark;  French  manufacturers 
have felt the squeeze most badly in this market. 
In Belgium, where most sales come from foreign-owned 
assembly lines, Germany is  in the lead with 43.7  %  of new 
registrations,  followed  by  France  with  26.8  %,  the  UK 
with  12 % and Italy with 9 %. 
In  Britain,  imports  have  increased  steadily  in  recent 
years;  rising  from  60,000  vehicles  of all  types  in  1960  to 
97,000  in  1967.  Nearly  all  imports  are  passenger  cars: 
only 4,200 foreign commercial vehicles  were bought by the 
UK in  1967.  Most of the  increase  in imports  represents 
purchases  from  Germany (39 % by value  of all  imported 
vehicles  in 1967)  but sales  of French, Italian and Swedish 
cars were also buoyant. 
On  the  export  side,  Germany  is  the  most  successful 
European  country:  more  than  half  her  total  production 
is  exported.  Volkswagen  sells  62 % of its  output abroad; 
its  percentage  of "vehicle  population" in foreign  countries 
ranged from  57  %  in Brazil to 3.4 % representing 2.5  mil-
lion  vehicles,  in  the  USA.  France  exports  40 %  of  its 
production,  Britain  about  35  %,  Italy  27  %,  Japan  13  % 
and  the  USA 5 %.  European manufacturers  add to their 
direct  export  sales  by  assembly  plants  abroad,  of  which 
Germany has  55  and Italy 25,  the USA have  122.  Britain 
has  assembly  lines  in  about  30  countries.  British  car 
exports  have  expanded  more  in  Western  Europe  than 
anywhere  else  during  the  last 20  years-from about 20 % 
to  nearly  50 % by  value.  EFTA  countries  took  almost 
20 % (by  value)  in  1967  and  EEC  countries  more  than 
15%. 
The American  challenge 
American cars are generally too large and too expensive 
for  European  tastes.  US  manufacturers  have  therefore 
set up plants inside the European market.  General Motors 
bought Opel (Germany) in  1928;  Ford opened its Cologne 
factory at the bottom of the slump in 1930;  today, Ameri-
can firms control 35 % of the German automobile industry. 
Penetration into France was slower off  the mark, but since 
Chrysler gained control of Simca in 1963  it has  been more 
successful.  Renault has been assembling American Motors' 
Rambler car since 1964; the Bernard lorry firm came under 
the control of Mack Trucks the same year; General Motors 
through its German Opel subsidiary completed a  new plant 
in Strasbourg in  1968.  In Britain,  52 % of production is 
under  American  control  (Ford,  Vauxhall  and  Rootes). 
American companies  also  own  the largest assembly  plants 
in  Belgium.  Italy  is  the  only  EEC  country  not  to  be 
affected in this  way.  In the Common Market as  a  whole, 
a  quarter of all US investments since  1960 has been in the 
automobile industry. 
It  is  obviously  very  difficult  for  European  firms  to 
compete with giants of this  size.  In 1963, a  good but not 
exceptional  year  for  the  US  automobile  industry,  GM's 
turnover  was  equal  to  the  French  budget  and  its  profit 
more  than  Renault's  1966  turnover  of  Fr.  7.5  billion. 
In  1965,  GM  (in  the  USA,  Germany  and  the  UK)  built 
7.2  million  vehicles,  Ford  (in  the  same  three  countries) 
3.7  million and Chrysler (in  the USA,  France and Britain) 
2.05  million.  Volkswagen, the largest European firm,  built 
no more than 1.6 million, followed by Fiat with one million 
and  Renault  with  583,000.  The  American  firms  have  all 
the  advantages  of scale,  which  enables  them  not  only  to 
invest  but  also  to  carry  out  the  essential  research  and 
development  programmes  at  a  level  far  higher  than  that 
of  their  European  competitors.  They  also  have  the 
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advantages, shared by many important sectors of American 
industry, of more advanced management and organizational 
techniques.  Their European subsidiaries  are given  a  great 
deal  of  independence,  but  are  backed  up  by  the  vast 
resources  of their parent firms. 
Many  European  manufacturers  believe  that,  faced  with 
such  a  challenge,  it  is  pointless  to  continue  along  old-
fashioned  competitive  lines  in  the  European  market. 
European  firms  should  get  together  to  meet  the  threat. 
Collaboration  of this  kind  could  take  various  forms. 
At  the  lowest  level,  commercial  agreements  for  the 
sharing  of sales  networks  have been concluded in  the  last 
five  or  six  years  between,  for  instance,  Fiat  and  Simca, 
Renault  and  Alfa-Romeo,  Citroen  and  NSU, and  Saviem 
and Henschel. 
A  second  form  of  collaboration,  which,  like  the  first, 
does  not  affect  firms'  independence,  concerns  reciprocal 
assembly  arrangements.  Deals  of  this  sort  have  been 
concluded,  among  others,  by BMC and Innocenti,  and  by 
Fiat and Neckar. 
Technical  co-operation  agreements  go  deeper,  as  they 
affect  the independence  of companies  and may in the end 
lead  to  mergers.  Peugeot  and  Renault  came  to  such an 
agreement  in  1966-an  unusual  marriage  of  public  and 
private  enterprise.  The  two  firms  continue  to  compete 
but  standardization  of  parts  will  lead  to  standardization 
of tooling  and  must  result  in  lower  costs.  In  the  longer 
term,  research  and  investment  are  to  be  co-ordinated. 
Despite  talks  between  Volkswagen,  Renault  and  Fiat, 
similar  agreement  on  a  European  scale  have  not  been 
concluded. 
But the market is  such  that something more than mere 
agreements  between  "large"  European  firms  is  needed: 
mergers  are needed if European companies are to  put up 
a  real fight against the incomparably larger US companies. 
Rumours  involving  various  companies  have  appeared 
from  time  to  time,  but  the  first  concrete  move  came  in 
September  1968  when  Fiat proposed  taking  over  Citroen, 
France's second largest motor manufacturer.  Such a  move 
had  been  rumoured  as  far  back  as  1962.  The  terms  of 
the  proposed  merger  were  never  published,  but  were 
reported  to  have  involved  the  acquisition  by  Fiat  of an 
important holding in Citroen (in which the Michelin family 
had a 53  % interest).  However, there was strong opposition 
from  the  French Government to the  control  by  a  foreign 
firm  of a  major national asset.  Nonetheless, the two firms 
continued  their negotiations  and it was  finally  agreed that 
Fiat should take a  15  % stake in Citroen and that the two 
firms  would  extend  their  commercial  and  technical  co-
operation  through  joint purchasing,  research  and  develop-
ment  programmes.  The  Fiat-Citroen  link-up  therefore 
represents  a  significant  step  forward  in  intra-European 
integration even if the hope of a  fully effective merger was 
frustrated. 
Conclusion 
In general,  then,  the  European  automobile  industry  has 
an uncertain  future  but one not without promise.  Future 
American policy can only be guessed at; how long will US 
manufacturers  remain  content  with  the  firms  they  now 
control?  The Japanese offensive  has no more than begun. 
In  1967  Japan  produced  3.1  million  vehicles  of all  types, 
overtaking Germany for  second place in the  world league, 
having  overtaken  Britain  for  third  place  in  1966  and 
France for  fourth  in  1964.  In  1968  Britain  ranks  fourth 
before France. 
It is  clear  that  the  long-term  success  or  failure  of the 
European automobile industry will  be decided  only  within 
a  wider  framework.  If the  Community's  customs  union, 
already achieved, is  to provide that framework by develop-
ing into a  full economic union, it will require much greater 
realism  and understanding in the part of national govern-
ments that has been shown in recent years. 3U 
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